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ABSTRACT
The question is asked how the incentives of private parties tobring
suit relate to what would be socially appropriate given thecosts of using
the legal system; and the answer presented in the model that is examined
involves two elements. The first is that as a potential plaintiff takes
into account only his own legal expenses in deciding whether tobring suit,
the private cost of suit is evidently less than the social cost (which
would include the defendant's legal expenses), suggestinga tendency toward
excessive liligation, other things equal. But consideration of the second
element complicates matters: as the plaintiff takes intoaccount his own
expected gains but not the social gains attaching to suit (which in the
model is the general effect of suit on potential defendants'behavior),
and as these social gains could be either larger or smaller thanhis gains,
there is a tendency in respect to litigation that could eithercounter or
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How do the incentives of private parties to bring suit
relate to what would be "socially appropriate." given the
costs of using the legal system? This question will be
considered in the present note employing a simple model
according to which suit involves legal expenses, and the
prospect of suit may encourage potential defendants to take
actions that reduce the likelihood that they cause monetary
losses for potential plaintiffs.1
To explain the answer to the question that will be
presented in the model, let us compare on the one hand the
private and social costs of suit, and on the other hand, the
private and social benefits of suit.
The first of these comparisons is unanthiguous in the
model, for to a potential plaintiff2 the cost of bringing
suit involves only his own legal expenses, whereas the
social cost includes the defendant's legal expenses as
well.3 Thus the private cost of suit is less than the
social cost, suggesting a tendency toward excessive
litigation, other things equal.4
However, comparison of the private and social benefits
of suit complicates matters. The private benefit of suit
resides in the model in the payment that the plaintiff2
expects to receive from the defendant, but the social benefit
of suit inheres in an "externality"--its effect on the
behavior of potential defendants generally.5 There is no
necessary connection between the private benefit of suit and
this social benefit. It may be that the social benefit
exceeds the private benefit; that is, suit may lead to a
reduction in losses caused by potential defendants which is
greater than a plaintiffts expected gains; or it may be that
the opposite holds true (consider the extreme case where
potential defendants have virtually no ability to reduce
losses, so that suit would have virtually no effect on
losses).6 In consequence, divergence between the social and
private benefits of suit may result either in a tendency
toward too little litigation (countering the previous tendency
due to the divergence between social and private costs) or
toward too much litigation (reinforcing the previous tendency).
After identifying the factors determining the social
appropriateness of litigation in the model, two numerical
examples will be discussed (to which readers who are not
interested in the formal model may immediately turn), an
extension of the model concerning settlement will be pre-
sented, and a concluding comment will be made.
1.The model7
It is assumed that parties are risk neutral; that
defendants are able to reduce the probability that they
cause losses by engaging in prevention activity;8 and that
doing so involves costs. Specifically, define3
£ =possibleloss suffered by plaintiffs; 2> 0;
p =probabilityof loss if defendants do not
engage in prevention activity; p>O;
q =probabilityof loss if defendants do engage
in prevention activity; p>q>O;
x =costto a defendant of prevention activity.
If a defendant causes a loss and the plaintiff brings suit,
he will obtain 2 in damages from the defendant.9 In regard
to the costs of suit itself, let
a =plaintiffs'legal expenses; a >0;
b =defendants'legal expenses; b >0.
(As noted, the possibility of settlement (whereby the legal
expenses could in large part be avoided) will be considered
subsequently.) The social welfare criterion is assumed to
be the minimization of total social costs, which equal the
sum of expected losses, prevention costs, and expected legal
expenses. It is assumed that, legal expenses apart, social
costs would be reduced by defendants' engaging in prevention
activity, that is
(1) x +< p2.
This is the case of interest, for otherwise there is obviously
no reason to employ a costly legal system to affect defendants'
behavior.
Given these assumptions, there will be suit when
(2)a<2,
for if a plaintiff suffers a loss and brings suit, his net
gain will be £ -a.Moreover, if (2) holds, then in (Nash)4
equilibrium defendants will engage in prevention activity;
for if a defendant does so, his expected costs will be
x +q(.+b);if he does not, his expected costs will be
p(. +b);and from (1) and q <p.it follows that
(3) x +q(+b)<p2+qb <p(2+b).
Consequently, total social costs will be10
(4) x +q2.+q(a+b),
prevention costs plus expected losses plus expected legal
expenses of plaintiffs and defendants.
If the inequality in (2) is reversed, then plaintiffs
will not bring suit,11 so that in equilibrium defendants
will not engage in prevention activity. Social costs will
therefore be
(5) p2.
With regard to the social desirability of suit, the





or, again equivalently, if
(7') q (a +b)<[(p—q)2—xl,
which says that the expected social cost of bringing suit is
less than the expected social benefit, the reduction in
losses net of prevention costs, (p -q)2-x.The private versus the social incentives to bring suit
may now be compared using (2) and (7)•12Specifically,
suit will occur when it ought not if (2) holds but the
inequality in (7) is reversed. More generally, the fol-
lowing factors tend to make it more likely that there will
be suit when it is not socially desirable: low legal ex-
penses of plaintiffs, high legal expenses of defendants,
high levels of loss, or low liability—induced reduction in
expected losses net of prevention costs.'3 On the other
hand, the converse case, when it would be desirable for suit
to occur but it does not, arises if (7) holds but the
in(2) is reversed and the, negative of the set of
factors just mentioned--high legal expenses of plaintiff,
low expenses of defendants, a low level of loss, a large
reduction in net expected losses due to liability--tends to
increase the likelihood that there will not be suit when it
would be socially desirable.14 Additionally, it should be
observed that there is no general tax, subsidy, or scheme
for shifting legal fees which will induce parties to bring
suit if and only if that is socially desirable. In other
words, any method for altering plaintiffs' costs that does
not depend on what would be the liability-induced reduction
in losses in the particular situation under consideration
will sometimes fail to result in a socially desirable out-
come15
Numerical examples. Let us illustrate the two situations of
interest: where suits are brought but that is socially6.
undesirable;and where suits are not brought but it would be
socially desirable that they be brought. In regard to the
first type of situation, suppose that
$1,000 =lossthat plaintiffs might suffer,
20%=probabilityof loss if defendants do not
engage in prevention activity,
10% =probabilityof loss if defendants do ehgage
in prevention activity,
$50 =costof preventionactivity,
$300 =legalexpense of suit for both plaintiffs
and defendants.
Since plaintiffs' legal expenses of $300 are less than the
$1,000 in damages that they would receive if they bring
suit, they will choose to bring suit. And since defendants
would therefore incur expected liability costs of 20% x
$1,000 =$200if they do not engage in prevention activity
but only 10% x $1,000 =$100if they do, they will find it
worthwhile to bear costs of $50 and to engage in prevention
activity. Thus total social costs will be $210--prevention
costs of $50 plus expected losses of 10% x $1,000 plus
expected legal expenses of plaintiffs and of defendants of
10% x ($300 +$300).However, if suits were not brought,
total social costs would be only $200--the expected losses
of 20% x $1,000 (for defendants would not engage in prevention
activity). Hence, that suits will be brought is socially
undesirable. (Here, of course, the problem may be viewed as
arising because plaintiffs do not take into account the fact
that when they bring suit, defendants bear $300 in legal
expenses.16)
S1
Now,to illustrate the other situation, assume that
$100 =lossthat plaintiffs might suffer,
10% =probabilityof loss if defendants do not engage
in prevention activity,
1% =probabilityof loss if defendants do engage in
prevention activity,
$1 =costof prevention activity,
$125 =legalexpense of suit for both plaintiffs and
defendants.
In this case, since plaintiffs' legal expenses of $125
exceed the damages of $100 that they would receive if they
brought suit, plaintiffs will choose not to bring suit; and
therefore defendants will have no motive to engage in preven-
tion activity. Thus, total social costs will be $10——the
expected losseb of 10% x $100. But if suits were brought,
defendants would be induced to ergage in prevention activity,
for doing so would cost only $1 and reduce their expected
liability from $10 to $1. Hence, total social costs would
be only $4.50--prevention costs of $1 plus expected losses
of 1% x $100 plus expected legal expenses of 1% x ($125 +
$125).In consequence, it is indeed socially undesirable
that suits will not be brought)7 (Here the problem may be
interpreted as arising because plaintiffs do not take into
account the general deterrent effect of suit as a benefit to
themselves.)
2.Extension of the model: the possibility of settlement
The essential nature of the comparison between the
private and the social incentive to make use of the legal8
system is not changed if account is taken of the possibility
of settlement. However, it will be seen that allowing for
settlement makes it more likely that suit, or rather the
threat of suit, is socially desirable. Let us assume that a
plaintiff will press a claim'8 if and only if he would
actually be willing to bring suit; and that he will then
decide to settle with the defendant if and only if there
exists a settlement which both he and the defendant would
prefer to going ahead with suit. Further, let
c =plaintiffs'expenses in reaching a settlement;
C> 0;
d =defendants'expenses in reaching a settlement;
d>0;





Under these assumptions, plaintiffs will press claims in the
same circumstances as before, when (2) holds, and then will
settle for an amount satisfying19
(14) £ +c-a<s<2 +b-d.
Thus, if (2) holds, and presuming defendants will choose to
engage in prevention activity,20 total social costs will be
given by
(15) x +q2+q(c+d)9
rather than by (4); and if the inequality in (2) is reversed,
the situation will be as before, with social costs given by
(5). Consequently, pressing claims is socially desirable if
(16) x-I-q+q(c+d)<p,
or, equivalently, if
(17) c +d<(l/q){(p—q)£ -xJ;
here the social costs of the pressing of claims are the
costs of settlement, c +d,rather than the costs of suit,
a +b,as in (7). Using (2) and (17), the private and
social incentives to press claims can be compared much as
before and analogous statements can be made. The main
difference is that, as noted, it is more likely that the
pressing of claims is socially desirable than that suit was
socially desirable ((17) holds more often than (7) since
c +d<a+b).
3.Concludingcomment
It should be clear that the basic points made here
about possible divergence between the private and social
incentives to bing suit would apply quite generally, in
respect to a more realistic description of the social costs
and the social benefits of use of the legal system.2' And
given this broad interpretation, one might view various
social efforts to promote or subsidize suit (availability of
the class action; establishment of small claims courts) as
social solutions to problems of otherwise insufficient
private motives to bring suit. Similarly one might see10
social attempts to reduce the volume of suits, passage of
statutes to circumvent the legal system (automobile no-fault,
workers' compensation) and, perhaps, the notion that society
is on balance too litigious as reflecting problems of excessive
private incentives to bring suit.11
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1. Ordover (1978) also studies a model of legal
liability and costly litigation, and makes several
observations that bear on the question of concern
to us; but the main point and the focus of his
paper is different; see note 13 below.
2. Henceforth, "potential plaintiffs" and "potential
defendants" will be referred to simply as "plaintiffs"
and "defendants" even though a "defendant" might
not in fact cause a loss and even though, if he
does, the "plaintiff" might choose not to sue.
3. For simplicity, public expenses connected with
operation of the courts are not considered in the
model.
4. This statement will be qualified when the possi-
bility of settlement is considered.
5. It will be seen that in the model the externality
is due solely to the fact that bringing suit
raises the likelihood that defendants will be
liable. The externality is thus logically distinct
from that associated with creation of precedent,
which is not considered in the model.12
6. Polinsky (1980) makes related points in examining
the issue of public versus private enforcement of
fines.
7. It will be seen that the model to be analyzed is
of a discrete rather than of a continuous nature.
The discrete model is presented because the results
in a continuous version of the model, while in
essence those of the discrete model, cannot be
expressed in as simple a form as in the discrete
model. (The principal complication in the continuous
model arises from the necessity to consider the
private vs. the social incentive to bring suit for
each possible level of loss.)
8. Prevention activity should be broadly interpreted
as taking care to fulfill a contractual obli—
gation, to prevent accidents, etc.
9. In other words, the defendant's (strict) liability
for loss is assumed. But this should not bother
the reader. In a previous version of the present
paper, fault-based liability was also considered,
andthequalitative nature of the results was
unchanged, provided that the model of such liability
allowed for the possibility that parties would
sometimes be found at fault. (In an over simple
model not allowing for such possibility, all
parties would be induced to act so that they would
never be found at fault, the consequence being13
that suits would never be worthwhile bringing;
thus, the legal system would turn out to be cost-
less.)
10. For simplicity, these will be written on aper
defendant basis.
11. We will not bother to discuss the case when a =2
and plaintiffs are indifferent whether or not to
bring suit.
12. And observe that the informal comparison made in
the introduction between private and social costs
and between private and social benefits can now be
seen explicitly: from the left-hand sides of (2)
and (7), it is evident that the private cost a is
less than the social cost a +b;and from the
right-hand sides, that the private benefit 2could
be either less than or greater than the quantity
1/q[(p -q)2 -x].
13. A precise statement is as follows. There will be
suit when that is socially undesirable (i) f.
given that b >(l/q)[(p -q)2 -x],the plain-
tiff's legal expense a is sUfficiently low; (ii)
if, given that a <2,the defendant's legal expense
b is sufficiently high; (iii) if, given that
a +b>(1/q)[(p-q)a -x],the loss 2 is high
enough to exceed a (but not by so much as to make
suit socially worthwhile); (iv) if, given that
a <2,the quantity (1/q)[(p -q)2—x]is suffic-
iently low (as when q -p).14
14. Thepoint of the comparison that has been made
between the social and the private incentive to
bring suit may be contrasted with that of Ordover
(1978), which examines the implications of costly
litigation when potential plaintiffs do not know
whether the particular parties they contemplate
suing would be found liable. Under.this assumption,
plaintiffs may have an inadequate incentive to
bring suit. We chose not to analyze Ordover's
assumption because our goal was to abstract from
issues concerning imperfect information.
15. If a plaintiff's costs do not depend on all the
variables 2,p,q, and x, it is clear that he will
not be induced to bring suit if and only if (7)
holds. For instance, making the plaintiff bear
the full social costs of suit, a +b,would not be
satisfactory, for the plaintiff would compare this
to .,whichcould be either higher or lower than
-q)2— x].
16. In other words, the expected social cost of suit
is $300 +$300=$600,and this exceeds the social
benefits due to deterrence.
17. Notice that the statement is true even though the
$250 total legal expenses of a suit substantially
exceedthe$100 amount at stake. But this is not
a paradox; suit is socially worthwhile because of
its deterrent effect.15
18. "Pressinga claim" should be interpreted either as
threatening legal proceedings or as actually
beginning them, but not as going ahead to trial.
19. This follows from the facts that for theplaintiff
to be made better off by settling, s -c>£-a
must hold, and for the defendant to be made better
off, s +d<£+bmust hold. It should also be
noted that the reason there is always settlement
is that we have not allowed (because it istangen-
tial to our purposes) for such possibilitiesas
that the plaintiff and the defendant might have
differing assessments of the likelihood ofpre-
vailing or of the size of the judgment.
20. A sufficient condition for this is that s ÷ d
21. Included among the social costs would, asprev-
iously remarked, be the expenses involved in
operating the courts, and among the social benefits,
the creation of precedent. On the latter, see
Landes and Posner (1979).
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